Not so AdHoc testing: formal methods in the standardization of the EDHOC protocol
Abstract: We believe that formal methods in security should be leveraged in all the standardisation’s of security protocols in order to strengthen their guarantees. To be effective, such analyses should be:
* maintainable: the security analysis should be performed on every step of the way, i.e. each iteration of the draft;
* pessimistic: all possible threat models, notably all sort of compromise should be considered;
* precise: the analysis should notably include as many real life weaknesses of the concrete cryptographic primitives specified.
In this talk, we illustrate how such a goal may be approached by detailing our analysis of the current IETF draft standard of the EDHOC protocol, as well as our subsequent interactions with its LAKE working group.
We will proceed in three steps, first introducing the Sapic+ platform that allows from a single modeling of a protocol to benefit from all the capabilities of multiple automated verification tools (ProVerif,Tamarin,DeepSec). We will then introduce multiple recent advances on how to better model the cryptographic primitives and their real life weaknesses. We will finally show how we leveraged Sapic+ along with the advanced primitive models to analyze the EDHOC protocol and provide feedback to the LAKE working group that has been integrated in latter drafts.
[Joint FM-SEC talk] The security protocol verifier ProVerif and its recent improvements: lemmas, induction, fast subsumption, and much more
ProVerif is a widely used automatic security protocol verifier that relies on symbolic model of cryptography. It can prove various security properties (secrecy, correspondences, some equivalences) for an unbounded number of sessions, as well as find attacks. In this talk, we will present an overview of ProVerif and its recent improvements. These improvements are twofold. First, we extended ProVerif with lemmas, axioms, proofs by induction, natural numbers, and temporal queries. These features not only extend the scope of ProVerif, but can also be used to improve its precision (that is, avoid false attacks) and make it terminate more often. Second, we reworked and optimized many of the algorithms used in ProVerif (generation of clauses, resolution, subsumption, …), resulting in impressive speed-ups on large examples. These improvements are joint work with Vincent Cheval and Véronique Cortier, to appear at IEEE Security and Privacy 2022. Joint talk with the FM-SEC network. Zoom…